In this paper, a novel framework for analyzing Physical Layer Security (PLS) of Directional Modulation (DM) techniques has been introduced. The proposed framework maps the concepts of PLS techniques to cryptographic techniques, enabling the analysis of DM techniques as block encryption ciphers. The relevance of the proposed framework has been shown by applying it on Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM). After appropriate physical layer mappings, the encryption strength of ASM is analyzed using National Institute of Standards and Technology's Statistical Test Suite (NIST's STS). The performance of ASM is benchmarked against strong block encryption cipher of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using data types of image, text, and audio. A new metric, namely Physical Layer Randomness (PLR), has been introduced for direct comparison of encryption strength of PLS techniques to that of cryptographic techniques. The analysis shows that Optimized Antenna Subset Selection (OASS) that reduced average Side-Lobe Levels (SLLs) and improved Symbol Error Rate (SER), has rather adverse effects on encryption strength of ASM. Furthermore, it has been found that scrambling the selection of antenna subsets imparts negligible improvement in PLR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Directional Modulation (DM) techniques exhibit the unique capability of wirelessly transmitting direction-dependent constellations of digital symbols which are random and encrypted along all the undesired directions, and unencrypted data is transmitted only along the desired direction. DM techniques for phased array exploit phase shifters and array weights to create desired amplitude and phase of digital modulation in the direction of Intended Receiver (IR) and random amplitude and phase in the undesired directions [1] . It is experimentally demonstrated that DM phased array generates low Symbol Error Rate (SER) along IR's direction while maintaining high SER in all the undesired directions [2] , making it difficult for eavesdropper (Eve) to extract any useful information. Several other techniques have been proposed such as, Near-Field Direct Antenna Modulation (NFDAM) that creates directional information by modulating the farfield radiation pattern of antenna by changing the near-field
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mohammad Tariqul Islam . electromagnetic boundary conditions of the antenna element (or antenna array) using high speed switches or varactors [3] . Fully-integrated transmitter for NFDAM operating at 60 GHz has been demonstrated to create directional data for secure communication [4] . Alternatively, pattern reconfigurable array based DM technique [5] requires antenna level modulation (in contrast to baseband digital modulation or phase shifters based modulation) to create desired amplitude and phase of digital modulation scheme. In [6] , authors applied DM on coded signals and it is shown that higher Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is required compared to uncoded signals to extract any useful information in the undesired directions, manifesting the effectiveness of DM technique against eavesdropping on coded signals.
In Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM), introduced for secure 5G millimeter-wave wireless communication [7] , directional ciphering is accomplished by randomly selecting subset of antenna array at the symbol transmission rate i.e. a new subset is selected for every symbol. However, randomly choosing subsets of antenna array has the disadvantage of high average side-lobe levels (SLLs). It is shown that VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ optimized selection of antenna subsets through simulated annealing [8] achieves better SER performance by reducing average SLLs along the unwanted directions. Initially, the proposed architecture of ASM was limited to phase modulation schemes only. Low-Complexity Antenna Subset Modulation (LC-ASM) [9] simplified the ASM architecture, extending its capability to accept any type of modulation scheme including Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM). Iterative-FFT based ASM optimization, proposed in [10] for large-scale arrays, has been shown to not only reduce the computational complexity of optimization algorithm, but also yields higher SER (and hence assumed higher Physical Layer Security (PLS)) compared to previous optimization techniques. Multi-beams Antenna Subset Modulation (MASM) extends conventional ASM to multi-directional ASM by broadcasting beams to multiple intended receivers [11] . Interference mitigation techniques for MASM [12] focus on reducing the average SLLs in the unwanted directions by optimization of antenna subsets. Presently in the domain of wireless communication, SER [13] and Secrecy Capacity (SC) [14] parameters are being used to measure the strength of physical layer security of DM techniques because their high values have been assumed to indicate high level of communication security and vice versa. All the optimization techniques have focused on increasing the SER and SC in the unwanted directions by reducing average SLLs [7] , [10] - [18] . This paper, for the first time, shows that SLL reduction has rather adverse effect on ASM in terms of randomness and confusion.
Physical Layer Randomness probe (PLR-probe) in [19] was proposed as a new parameter for analyzing the physical layer encryption strength of DM techniques. It was shown, using the metric of PLR, that scrambling the codebook (total number of ways in which antenna subsets can be selected) after using all the possible combinations provides stronger physical layer randomness in comparison to repeated codebook. However, the analysis is limited to only one eavesdropper direction. This claim, after thorough analysis along multiple eavesdropper directions, have been investigated and found insignificant.
In this paper, an extensive investigation of ASM has been conducted by analyzing ASM as physical layer block cipher for 37 eavesdropper directions (starting from θ ED = 0 • to 180 • , with an angle increment of θ ED = 5 • ) with highly correlated data types of image, audio and text. PLR metric has been modified to benchmark the randomness and confusion potential of ASM against modern cryptographic symmetrickey block encryption algorithm of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The purpose of DM techniques is to add another security layer at the physical transmission channel, however there has not been any parameter that directly measures the encryption strength i.e. the level of randomness and confusion. PLR has been, for the first time, thoroughly analyzed in this paper to show that it is the adequate measure of randomness. Secondly, the level of randomness added by DM techniques is relative to the input data (plaintext). However as prevalent in wireless communication, randomly generated streams of data are being used as input. Since no direct measure of randomness introduced by DM techniques was being measured (instead SER and SC were being measured that supposedly showed cumulative effect of randomness of original input data and randomness introduced by DM technique), there was no way to know the effectiveness of DM technique as far as security at physical layer is concerned. In the domain of cryptography, the standard practice is to analyze the encryption strength of any encryption algorithm using highly correlated real-world data [20] , contrary to randomly generated stream of data. In this work, therefore, all the analyses have been performed on highly correlated real-world data.
Following are the novel contributions of this work: 1. The framework of PLR has been modified as a benchmark metric for analysis and comparison of randomness and confusion of ASM to that of block encryption ciphers. It is shown that after appropriate physical layer mappings, the PLR of ASM can be computed and compared to encryption strength of strongest known application-layer block encryption algorithm i.e. AES. Detailed PLR analysis of ASM for different antenna subset selection techniques has been performed for all the eavesdropper directions for the first time in this work. 2. It has been shown that the conventional approach to improve PLS in ASM by reducing SLLs in unwanted directions (increasing SER and decreasing SNR) as was adopted in [7] is not correct. It has rather adverse effects on ASM in terms of randomness and confusion, as indicated by failure of multiple National Institute of Standards and Technology's Statistical Test Suite (NIST STS) randomness tests along multiple eavesdropper directions. 3. Finally it has been proven that scrambling the codebook, as was done in [19] , also does not significantly enhance physical layer randomness. In some directions it does improve PLR and decreases the number of failed tests. However, it does not improve PLR to attain randomness comparable to AES in many directions. 4. Additionally, another possible selection of codebook is the combination of SLL optimized and scrambled antenna subsets, that was not investigated in [19] , has also been thoroughly analyzed in this work. The remaining paper has been organized as following: The system model for mathematically analyzing physical layer ciphering is described in Section II. PLR has been introduced in Section III. The detailed discussion on results has been reserved for Section IV. At the end of paper, conclusion and remarks are summarized in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL FOR MATHEMATICALLY ANALYZING PHYSICAL LAYER CIPHERING
In this section, it is mathematically shown that Conventional Phased Array (CPA) does not provide any physical layer security when compared with ASM that provides high level of communication security. It is followed by the concept of physical layer ciphering by DM techniques. Finally, it is mathematically shown that for Eve to extract original transmitted constellations of data in case of ASM, would require not only the relative direction of transmission but also the configuration of antenna subsets used for every symbol duration.
Suppose that Alice wants to establish point-to-point wireless communication link to Bob using a linear phased array of N isotropic antenna elements. In conventional beamforming, all the antennas of an array are ON all the time. Furthermore, it is assumed that the direction of IR i.e. Bob is known to Alice. However, Eve is situated anywhere outside the main lobe of array, as shown in Figure 1 . The Array Factor in this case would be [21] :
where
and a is the wavenumber i.e. a = 2π λ .
In Eq. (2), θ IR is the known direction of Bob and d is the inter-element spacing taken equal to λ/2 to avoid grating lobes, β is the progressive inter-element phase difference set equal to:
to point the main beam in the direction of IR. The Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) encoded symbols are being transmitted i.e. x = √ E s N e jφ s (t) , where φ s (t) is the phase of these symbols (i.e. 45 • , 135 • , 225 • , and 315 • degrees for 00, 01, 11, 10 symbols respectively) at time t and √ E s is the energy of each symbol which is normalized by N and given as input to each antenna element.
In antenna subset modulation, instead of using the complete array, only a subset of M (M < N ) elements is used which is randomly chosen for every symbol transmission. The remaining N − M elements remain switched OFF during that time interval. There are total possible combinations of N ! M !(N −M )! in which the subsets of antennas could be formed. These subsets are stored in a codebook matrix (K) and one code vector (k) is used for every symbol transmission.
A. PHYSICAL LAYER CIPHERING AND CONVENTIONAL BEAMFORMING
The process of conventional beamforming has been shown in Figure 1 . The main lobe is directed towards a-priori known direction of IR. The symbol X received in this direction is: Using Eq. (3), the above expression simplifies to:
Hence Bob in the direction of θ IR receives the original phase (the plaintext) of the transmitted symbol i.e. φ s (t) with amplitude √ E s . Now, let us consider that Eve is situated along θ ED . The symbol Y received by Eve would be:
Since β = −ad cos θ IR , we have:
In the above expression, since θ ED = θ IR , the phase of the original transmitted symbols is not received by Eve. Using phasor addition, Eq. (7) simplifies to:
where C A is the resultant amplitude of phasor addition of exponentials in Eq. (7) and φ ED is the resultant phase of the array in the direction of Eve. The total phase received by Eve is φ T (t) = φ s (t) + φ ED , that is the summation of phase of the original symbol φ s (t) and φ ED . Since C A < N , the amplitude of symbols received by Eve is always less than that of IR. Hence the four QPSK symbol phases received by Eve are:
For fixed direction of Eve, the value of φ ED remains constant. Eve can easily recover the phase of originally transmitted symbols through estimation and by using a sensitive receiver to compensate for the weak amplitude it receives. Therefore, conventional phased array does not provide any PLS.
B. PHYSICAL LAYER CIPHERING BY DIRECTIONAL MODULATION TECHNIQUES
All the DM techniques generate symbol constellations that are direction-dependent. A sharply defined constellation is transmitted only in the direction of IR. Along the rest of the directions, symbols are distorted both in amplitude and phase. The random distortion in amplitude and phase along Eve's direction is the source of physical layer ciphering in DM techniques.
In classical symmetric key cryptography, the nonencrypted message is called plaintext (P) which is acted upon by encryption (Enc) algorithm to create an encrypted message called ciphertext (C). Decryption (Dec) is performed on ciphertext using key (k) to recover originally transmitted plaintext. In simplified form, it can be written as:
Similarly, any DM technique can be thought of as physical layer ciphering method (just as block encryption algorithms are application layer ciphers in cryptography). DM techniques have the unique capability of transmitting encrypted message (ciphertext) along the direction of Eve and nonencrypted message (plaintext) in the known direction of IR. For instance, in ASM [7] , a codebook containing the antenna subsets or keys that is changed at symbol rate is formed. Mathematically, physical layer ciphering in DM techniques can be represented as:
. . . . . .
where n is the number of digital symbols of message transmitted by Alice. The above set of equations can be summarized as:
For Eve to extract any useful information i.e. plaintext P i from ciphertext C i , it would require all the keys k i sequentially used by Alice for all the transmitted symbols. This process of physical layer decryption can be summarized as:
For ASM, it will be shown in next subsection that ciphertext C i transmitted in the direction of Eve can be represented as:
where φ s (t) is the phase of transmitted symbol and φ ED (k i ) is the randomly changing phase which requires the knowledge of keys (the antenna subsets) as well as the direction of IR, as will be shown in the next subsection.
C. PHYSICAL LAYER CIPHERING BY ANTENNA SUBSET MODULATION
In ASM, digital data to be transmitted is phase-modulated and fed to the phase shifters, as shown in Figure 2 . The phase shifters adjust the phase of each branch and the amplified signal is fed to high-speed RF switches through power amplifiers. RF switches either turn ON or turn OFF the antennas depending on the key (antenna subset) during that symbol.
Each antenna subset has the information of indices of M antennas that are to be turned ON out of N total antennas in the array. Thus the total possible combinations are
All these combinations are stored in a codebook (K), the dimensions of which are C N M × N . Each element of the codebook (K im ) can be represented in sets notation as:
Every antenna subset (k i ) can be represented as:
such that, each i th row (or code k i ) of the codebook comprises of exactly M number of 1's, that is:
where i can take any values between 1 and Let's assume that Alice wants to transmit x symbol to Bob. The symbol is multiplied by array factor and the antenna subset (k i ) for that symbol duration. The array factor in this case would be:
The resulting symbol X in the direction of Bob would be:
In the direction of IR β = −ad cos θ IR . Therefore, the above equation becomes:
Eq. (20) is the amplitude scaled version of Eq. (5) which shows that IR receives the original phase of symbols (plaintext) i.e. φ s (t).
Now assume that the relative direction of Eve from the antenna array is φ ED (k i ), where φ ED (k i ) signifies that the relative direction of Eve with respect to antenna array varies for every symbol depending upon antenna subset k i . The symbol Y in this case would be:
. (21) Using β = −ad cos θ IR , this expression become:
The phase received by Eve is φ
is the arbitrary phase that is randomly changing for every symbol duration (due to random selection of antenna subset in ASM). Eve would require not only the relative direction of IR but also the key (antenna subset) used by Alice for every symbol to extract original transmitted phase i.e. φ s (t).
III. PHYSICAL LAYER RANDOMNESS (PLR)
In this section, physical layer randomness has been discussed as a metric for randomness of DM techniques. ASM has been analyzed using this metric and it has been found that ASM fails to ensure high degree of randomness or physical layer security. The image data and text data has PLR comparable to AES only along one direction. PLR tests fail in all the directions for audio data. Furthermore, it has been shown that SLL optimization and scrambling of codebook has adverse effects on PLR, causing significant reduction of PLR. Reconstructed images for two different Eve directions and their p-values have been included at the end of this section.
A. PHYSICAL LAYER MAPPINGS
Modern symmetric key block cipher crypto-systems e.g. advanced encryption standard consist of five main components [20] : plaintext (P), ciphertext (C), encryption algorithm (E), decryption algorithm (D), and a set of keys (K). These components of application layer cryptograhic systems have been mapped to physical layer security systems to define a metric of randomness/security for physical layer. The mappings are as following:
• Mapping 1 -Plaintext Mapping: Plaintext (P) in crypto-systems is mapped to the digital communication symbols being transmitted by a PLS system. In symmetric-key block ciphers, the bits to be transmitted are converted into blocks. Each crypto-system has specific block size e.g. 128 bits for AES. In ASM, the number of bits in each encoded symbol can be thought of as a block for that symbol duration. Therefore, block size is dependent upon modulation scheme being used e.g. for QPSK and 8-PSK block size is 2 and 3 bits respectively. In the final step of this mapping, digital symbol is assigned to each physical layer data block.
• Mapping 2 -Ciphertext Mapping: Ciphertext (C) in crypto-systems is equivalent to the received symbols that are randomly scrambled and distorted in phase and amplitude in the direction of eavesdropper by a PLS system.
• Mapping 3 -Encryption Algorithm Mapping: In this mapping, application layer encryption algorithm (E) e.g. AES [22] , Data Encryption Standard (DES) [23] , Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [24] is mapped to the specific degree of randomness being exploited by a PLS system: phase shifters based directional amplitude and phase synthesis of constellations in the desired direction [6] , randomly choosing M antennas out of N elements of antenna array as in ASM [7] , exploitation of channel randomness for physical layer security [25] , the list of pre-distributed keys to nodes for securing wireless sensor networks [26] , or any degree of freedom being secretly used for providing PLS. In this paper, AES has been used as a benchmark to analyze DM technique of ASM. Following four mathematical transformations are involved in AES algorithm [27] :
There are two parts of any modern encryption algorithm; confusion and diffusion. In AES, SubBytes() opeartion introduces confusion by using Substitution-box (S-box) which is designed using highly non-linear mathematical functions. In this transformation, plaintext bytes are nonlinearly substituted by ciphertext bytes using S-box. It is the only component of confusion in AES. This transformation is followed by ShiftRows(), MixColumns(), and AddRoundKey() operations. These three operations introduce diffusion by shifting block rows, by mixing columns, and by XORing the bits of data with secretly generated pre-shared keys respectively. Operations performed in PLS domain are mapped to equivalent transformations performed in AES to analyze ASM. The details are summarized in Table 1 . AES-128, having key size of 128 bits, has been selected in this mapping. In ASM, keys are stored in the codebook. Each code/key contains the indices of antennas that are switched ON during that symbol transmission. Directional substitution of plaintext symbols by ciphertext symbols in the direction of Eve in ASM is equivalent to byte substitution operation in AES. In other words, the physical layer encryption mechanism of ASM can be called Directional Substitution-box (DS-box), which is equivalent to S-box byte substitution mechanism of application layer encryption. For ShiftRows() and Mix-Columns(), there are no equivalent operations in ASM. Adding pre-shared unique round key after every round in AES is equivalent to changing the antenna subset after every symbol duration.
• Mapping 4 -Decryption Algorithm Mapping:
Decryption (D) is the inverse operation of encryption. It is performed on the reception side to recover originally transmitted plaintext from encrypted data (ciphertext). AES decryption algorithm comprises of following steps: -InvSubBytes() -InvShiftRows() -InvMixColumns() -AddRoundKey() After reception of data blocks, the process of decryption starts. First, the bytes are inverse substituted using inverse S-box. Then the rows of block ciphertext are shifted in the reverse order by InvShiftRows() operation. Similarly, columns are shifted in the reverse order in InvMixColumns() operation and, finally, pre-shared key for that particular block is XORed in order to recover original plaintext. XOR is an involution operation (an operation that is inverse of itself, just like logical complement). Therefore, XORing the data with same bits (pre-shared key) by Bob nullifies the effect of AddRoundKey() operation which was performed during encryption. Equivalently, in ASM plaintext is transmitted in the direction of IR by applying compensation at the transmit side (i.e. balancing out the antenna phases of each subset by adjusting β), therefore no physical layer decryption is required along the intended direction of Bob. However, that is not the case for Eve. For Eve to decrypt the data with good fidelity, it would not only require the direction of IR but also the keys (antenna subsets) used for every symbol transmission, as summarized in Table 2 . Figure 3 . The process of physical layer encryption by ASM using the above mentioned mappings will be discussed in this example. QPSK modulation is being used for transmission of digital data. Suppose that Alice wants to securely transmit a byte of value 219 to Bob situated in a known direction. Since we are using QPSK modulation scheme, the byte has to be converted into its binary value and divided into physical layer blocks of size equal to 2 bits. In this way, four blocks of binary data are formed. QPSK phases are assigned to each of the four blocks. For instance, block s 1 containing the value of 11 is assigned QPSK phase of 225 • . This completes plaintext mapping. After this, a key is selected from the codebook. The key contains the indices of antennas that are to be switched ON during transmission of s 1 physical layer block. Each key has associated with it an array factor that introduces random phase and amplitude in the direction of Eve due to selection of random indices of antenna elements, as already described in Section II. The constellation is "substituted" (scrambled and randomized) in the direction of Eve. The same process is repeated for all the blocks in different symbol duration using different key (antenna subset). It is assumed that there are three eavesdroppers along different directions and all of them receive the ciphertext. None of them has the knowledge of keys and direction of IR in order to perform physical layer decryption. Therefore, none of them can make out the value of originally transmitted byte. The recovered ciphertext bytes by Eve are 172, 49, and 70, none of which is same as plaintext byte of value 219 received by Bob. This illustrates the process of physical layer encryption in unwanted directions.
B. NIST STATISTICAL TEST SUITE
In modern cryptography, there are three commonly used randomness test suites; Dieharder battery of tests [28] , TestU01 [29] , and NIST STS [30] . In the development of PLR, NIST tests have been adapted owing to central importance of NIST STS as a standard for randomness analysis and benchmarking performance of AES. NIST STS is a package that analyzes randomness of binary sequences by checking the ciphertext against templates of different types of non-randomness that could exist in the binary sequences. , and accordingly their p-values are denoted by; P F , P B , P R , P L , P K , P D , P N , P O , P U , P C , P T , P A , P S , P E and P V . The tests which generate more than one p-values, minimum p-value is selected for simplification of analysis.
C. PHYSICAL LAYER RANDOMNESS (PLR)
The p-values of all the tests obtained by NIST STS contain vital information about randomness of ciphertext. According to statistical hypothesis testing criteria laid down by NIST, for any specific test, if p − value < 0.01, the null hypothesis (H o ) (i.e. the data is random) is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis (H a ) (i.e. the data is non-random) is accepted. That particular test is considered as failed and the ciphertext is declared as non-random. If p − value ≥ 0.01, the test is considered as passed, null hypothesis (H o ) is accepted and the ciphertext is declared as random. Moreover, larger magnitude of p-value indicates the there is more randomness and confusion for the test under consideration.
In order to define PLR, ranks ζ are assigned to each p-value. If p − value ≥ 0.5, the ciphertext is highly random and it is assigned a good rank of ζ = 5. If 0.4 ≤ p − value < 0.5, the rank ζ = 4 is assigned. The same trend is followed in assigning the ranks and 6 classes are formed as shown in Table 3 . If p − value < 0.01, the test is considered as failed and F rank is assigned. The presence of even single F rank indicates complete failure of randomness for that PLS technique in that direction.
Definition: Physical layer randomness is defined as the cumulative sum of ranks assigned to all the NIST tests based on their p-values. Mathematically, it is expressed as:
where N T is equal to the total number of NIST STS tests that are performed. In our case, it is equal to 15, since we have performed all the tests.
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this section, the results of PLR generated using different codebooks are presented for the case of ASM. Originally, the authors in [7] used two types of codebooks for ASM; Randomized Antenna Subset Selection (RASS) and SLL Optimized Antenna Subset Selection (OASS). Later on, the authors in [19] analyzed two more techniques of; Random and Repeated Selection (RRS), and Random and Scrambled Selection (RSS). The process of scrambling the codebook, after utilization of all the codes, effectively creates a new codebook with different sequence of codes. All these codebook types have been analyzed and benchmarked against AES using PLR metric in this section. Antenna subset selection techniques for ASM are summarized in Figure 4 . For the purpose of incorporation of two different antenna subset selection techniques from previous literature on the subject of ASM, some terminologies have been renamed for the purpose of simplification and unification of antenna subset selection techniques in this paper:
• Randomized antenna subset selection in [7] (which is same as random and repeated selection in [19] ) will be referred to as Repeated Codebook (RC).
• SLL optimized antenna subset selection in [7] will be referred to as Optimized and Repeated Codebook (ORC).
• Random and scrambled selection in [19] will be referred to as Scrambled Codebook (SC).
• Moreover, another possibility of combining the two codebook selection techniques of SLL optimized antenna subsets [7] and scrambled antenna subsets [19] has also been investigated in this paper. It will be referred to as Optimized and Scrambled Codebook (OSC). The total number of antennas are N = 20, out of which M = 15 randomly chosen antennas are ON for every symbol duration. Symbols are encoded using QPSK modulation scheme. Therefore, according to the mappings described in Section III, key size is equal to 20, key space is SLL optimization of codebook has been performed using simulated annealing algorithm, as done by authors who originally proposed OASS for ASM [7] . Simulated annealing is a heuristic optimization algorithm that seeks to find approximate global optimum in a large search space. The goal here is to synthesize the codebook containing only those antenna subsets which have low sidelobe levels in the undesired directions of eavesdropper. The cost function for optimization can be written as:
where is the range of angles outside the main lobe which require minimization of radiation pattern. Exponential cooling schedule, which yields best SLL reduction for ASM [7] , has been adopted in our paper. The resulting average normalized radiation pattern of ASM and SLL optimized ASM is shown in Figure 5 . The process of scrambling the codebook has no effect on the average normalized radiation pattern because it only changes the sequence of keys and overall average of radiation pattern (being the sum of radiation patterns associated with all the keys) remains the same.
The transmit direction is θ IR = 60 • . With the incremental increase of θ ED = 5 • , Eve's position has been shifted from θ ED = 0 • to θ ED = 180 • and the data received by Eve has been analyzed using NIST STS. The evaluation of PLR from p-values by assigning appropriate ranks for image at θ ED = 35 • , audio at θ ED = 45 • , text data at θ ED = 45 • and its comparison with PLR of plaintext and AES encrypted message is shown in Table 4 , 5, and 6 respectively. Plaintext image has the PLR of 18 + 8F, indicating PLR magnitude of 18 and failure of 8 randomness tests. AES encrypted image has the PLR of 44 and zero F ranks. Similar calculations for audio and text data are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 , respectively. A comparison of p-values of ASM encrypted message with AES for image, audio, and text data for all four codebooks is shown in Figure 6 . Plaintext has the least magnitude of p-values for all randomness tests. RC and SC codebooks have p-values comparable to that of AES. Furthermore, it can be observed that SLL optimized codebooks i.e. ORC and OSC have lower magnitude of p-values for all three data types compared to RC and SC.
PLR plots of image, audio and text data are shown in Figure 7 . In all these graphs, the left y-axis indicates the magnitude of PLR and the number of failed tests are plotted on right y-axis. Higher value of PLR indicates higher degree of randomness and confusion. For any direction, higher the number of failed tests, lesser will be the randomness and confusion in that direction. ASM has been benchmarked against well-known application layer symmetric key block encryption cipher of AES-128 to compare its performance. Since AES is not a directional modulation technique, its PLR is same for all Eve directions. The calculations of PLR are explained in Section 3. For instance, PLR of AES encrypted image data is 44 and it does not have any failed tests in any direction, as indicated by the solid blue lines in Figure 7 . Following observations can be made in Figure 7 about encryption strength of ASM:
1. PLR of repeated codebook of ASM is more or less the same as PLR of scrambled codebook and it is comparable in magnitude to PLR of AES for image data. 2. Both for ORS and OSC, PLR is lesser compared to that of RC and SC, with the exception of few directions. 3. There are no failed NIST tests only for; image data at θ ED = 35 • , and text data at θ ED = 45 • . Along the rest of the directions, there are one or multiple failed tests indicating the failure of physical layer security. The images reconstructed by Eve along θ ED = 35 • for different types of codebook are shown in Figure 8 . This is the direction for which there are no failed tests. It can clearly be seen in Figure 8 that the image is truly random (and hence secure against eavesdropping) only for RC and SC, for which the value of PLR is 45 and 47 respectively. For ORC, the image is less randomized (as also indicated by the decreased PLR of 37 and failure of serial test in Table 4 ). Similarly for OSC, the image features are exuberantly visible (as also indicated by decreased PLR of 26 and failure of non-overlapping template matching test, overlapping template matching test, universal statistical test, and serial test in Table 4 ). Along θ ED = 100 • , the images are shown in Figure 9 , in which similar observations of PLR reduction for ORC and OSC can be made. In the direction of IR along θ ED = 60 • , the reconstructed image (plaintext) is shown in Figure 10 . It has the least magnitude of PLR i.e. 18 and F ranks for 8 randomness tests.
Similar observations can be made about audio and text data in Table 5 and Table 6 , respectively. Along θ ED = 45 • for audio data, PLR decreased from 47 (for SC) to 16 (for ORC and OSC) and the number of failed tests increased from 1 to 10. Similarly, along θ ED = 45 • for text data, PLR decreased from 46 (for SC) to 17 (for OSC) and the number of failed tests increased from 0 to 9. PLR plots in Figure 7 (b) for audio data and Figure 7 (c) for text data are also indicating the same. It can be observed that there is significant reduction of PLR and higher failed tests for ORC and OSC compared to RC and SC for ASM.
Clearly, performing SLL optimization (ORC and OSC) on antenna subsets in ASM has rather adverse effects on physical layer randomness for all the data types of image, audio and text, contrary to what was implicitly assumed in [7] based on the parameter of SER. The main reason for this adverse effect is that by forming the codebook containing only those antenna subsets which yield low sidelobe level properties, the key space (or size) of codebook is considerably reduced (in our case from 15, 504 to only 272 antenna subsets). By optimizing the codebook for low SLL, all the keys (antenna subsets in case of ASM) which have large SLL properties are discarded. The codebook is limited to contain only those antenna subsets which have low SLL properties. This cause reduction of usable combinations of antenna subsets and hence the size of antenna subsets codebook. The smaller size of codebook means that there are lesser number of usable keys, the effect of which is reflected upon diminished physical layer randomness. Furthermore, the process of scrambling the codebook (i.e. SC) does not enhance the PLR notably. In some directions, it does improve the magnitude of PLR and decrease the number of failed tests. However, it does not improve the PLR enough to attain randomness comparable to AES in all the directions, as evident by the comparison of solid red line for RC and dotted blue line for SC in Figure 7 . Therefore, scrambling the codebook as claimed in [19] does not actually increase the physical layer randomness.
V. CONCLUSION
The physical layer security of Antenna Subset Modulation (ASM) has been analyzed as block encryption ciphers for the first time in this paper. Analogous to the five components of symmetric-key block encryption ciphers, appropriate physical layer mappings are defined for ASM. After successful mappings, ASM is analyzed using p-values based standard randomness tests. Ranks are assigned to each p-value and the cumulative sum of ranks is introduced as a new metric, namely Physical Layer Randomness (PLR). This approach bridges the gap between conventional data encryption and modern physical layer security techniques by offering a common framework for direct comparison of randomness. It has been found that sidelobe level optimization of ASM results in reduction of encryption strength as indicated by reduced PLR. This is due to significant reduction of key space or size of codebook (possible combinations in which antenna subsets could be formed). Furthermore, it has been found that scrambling the codebook after utilization of all the keys imparts negligible improvement in PLR. The analysis, therefore, renders both sidelobe level optimization and scrambling as ineffective antenna subset selection techniques for the improvement of physical layer security of ASM, contrary to implicit assumption of physical layer security improvement based on symbol error rate characteristics in the previous literature. Clearly, some other technique for improving randomness of ASM (i.e. selection of antenna subsets) needs to be devised, for which PLR is to be used as standard parameter.
